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The ILRP focuses on the areas of international law that are most important to global innovation, prosperity and sustainability: international economic law, international intellectual property law and international environmental law. In its research, the ILRP is attentive to the emerging interactions among international and transnational law, Indigenous law and constitutional law. Conor Gearty has dramatically suggested that Brexit is becoming Britain's Vietnam, partially in the sense of becoming a policy quagmire that threatens the slow erosion of established human rights and civil liberties. 4 Colin Harvey and other commentators in Northern Ireland have been vocal in expressing the fear that Brexit will undermine the human rights framework that forms a key element of the Northern Irish peace settlement, laid out in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. 5 Nor have these concerns been confined to academic commentary. The Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) of the UK Parliament has expressed concern that the process of Brexit could have a negative impact on human rights across a number of different areas, if careful action is not taken to alleviate its impact. 6 Similar concerns have been expressed in parliamentary debates on Brexit and, in particular, on the provisions of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill. 7 In contrast, other commentators have argued that these concerns are radically overstated. For example, a response to the JCHR's report co-authored by a number of prominent law professors and published under the banner of the Judicial Power Project (a project funded by Policy Exchange, a leading centre-right think tank) argued that there is nothing intrinsic to the process of the United Kingdom exiting the European Union that necessarily leads to a reduction in the substantive protection of human rights. 8 The UK government has also argued that the legal adjustments required to give effect to Brexit will not lead to any diminution of the scope of core legal safeguards. 9 Indeed, some commentators even argue that leaving the European Union offers an opportunity for the United Kingdom to develop superior standards of rights protection than currently exist in British or European law -or, at least, to develop standards that better reflect British values and/or popular views as to the appropriate content of human rights norms.
Executive Summary
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How are we to assess the merits of these competing claims, especially given the highly contested nature of Brexit and the charged political environment that surrounds it? As a first step, it is helpful to identify whether, how and to what extent the Brexit process creates a real risk that existing human rights standards may be eroded. Identifying the extent of any such risk then makes it possible to assess the potential impact of Brexit on rightsbearing in mind that Brexit is playing out against the background of the United Kingdom's particular political and constitutional culture, and Brexit's future impact will inevitably be shaped by this culture. In carrying out this assessment, the aim is not to make a polemical argument about the pros and cons of Brexit: instead, the objective of this analysis is to clarify Brexit's potential impact on human rights in the short-to medium-term future.
The Risks of Brexit
The majority of the commentators expressing concern about the potential impact of Brexit on human rights have focused on how it may undermine existing legal methods of rights protection. Within this general strand of criticism, several different subthemes can be identified. 
The Potential Impact of Brexit on Existing EU Legislative Protection for Human Rights
To start with, some commentators have highlighted the important role that EU primary and secondary legislation has come to play in securing certain human rights -which is particularly the case in areas such as discrimination law, workers' rights, environmental law, data protection and migrant rights. 11 In all of these contexts, EU law sets out minimum standards with which all EU member states must comply. Furthermore, the supremacy and direct effect of EU law means that these baseline standards cannot be overridden or diluted by national lawmakers. As a result, the protection these standards provide for human rights is relatively insulated against the vicissitudes of national politics. In addition, the purposive approach adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in interpreting EU law, and its willingness to read primary and secondary legislation with reference to the overarching human rights commitments that are supposed to underpin the EU legal order, have ensured that these rightsprotective standards often have real teeth.
For example, the set of directives, treaty provisions and general principles that make up EU equality law requires states to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of age, disability, gender, race or ethnicity, religion or belief and sexual orientation in the area of employment and occupation (and, for gender and race, in access to goods and services and other areas of social advantage). By virtue of these legal standards, EU member states are obliged to ensure that their domestic laws provide effective protection against direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and victimization linked to one or more of the four protected grounds of non-discrimination set out in the EU equality directives. The CJEU has also given a purposive interpretation to the relevant EU legal norms in this context. 12 As a consequence, EU equality law provides strong protection against many forms of discrimination. This has had a substantial impact on UK law, which has had to be repeatedly modified and strengthened in response to its requirements. 13 Furthermore, the supremacy and direct effect of EU law has helped to give discrimination law a quasi-constitutional status in the United Kingdom, embedding it against attempts to dilute its requirements or water down its scope. In so doing, EU equality law provides substantive protection for the right to equality and non-discrimination as protected by article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights 14 (ECHR) and other human rights treaty provisions: it acts as a backstop to the provisions of the Equality Act 2010
15 and other UK anti-discrimination legislation, ensuring that their provisions, and UK law more generally, give adequate effect to the principle of non-discrimination. 16 The situation is similar when it comes to the other areas mentioned above where EU law protects human rights. The demanding requirements of EU data protection law, as interpreted by the CJEU with reference to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 17 (CFR), protects the rights to privacy and freedom of expression. The provisions of instruments such as the Working Time Directive 18 and the Part-Time Workers Directive 19 help to secure core labour rights. EU law in the area of immigration, asylum and migrant rights, while at times problematic from a human rights perspective, also can take effect in a way that strengthens respect for the right to privacy, home and family life. EU environmental law has played a key role in protecting air quality and other essentials to human health and the right to life. 20 However, after the United Kingdom exits the European Union, these standards will presumably no longer enjoy the benefit of supremacy/direct effect. Therefore, even though they will remain part of UK law by virtue of the provisions of the EU (Withdrawal) Act, UK withdrawal from the European Union creates the possibility that they may be diluted, amended or repealed by subsequent UK primary or secondary legislation. Furthermore, the purposive approach generally adopted by the CJEU in interpreting these standards may not be adopted by UK courts in the future as they might consider themselves constitutionally inhibited from following the CJEU's lead in this regard.
As a consequence, Brexit poses a potential threat to all these EU standards -and, by extension, to the specific and embedded forms of legal protection they afford to human rights. The extra layer of security currently provided by the supremacy and direct effect of EU law to many of the legal rules that help to secure equality and labour, environmental and migrants' rights at present will fall away -opening them up to the possibility of being watered down or substantially eroded.
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The Potential Impact of Brexit on the Legal Status of the General Principles of EU Law and the CFR This concern is exacerbated by the likelihood that Brexit will dilute the impact of certain overarching aspects of EU law that serve to ensure the conformity of all aspects of EU law and national implementing measures with human rightsnamely, the general principles of EU law and the CFR. Commentators have again focused upon this risk with concern, with some identifying it as perhaps the most significant negative consequence of Brexit for human rights protection.
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The CJEU has recognized the existence of certain general principles that underpin the EU legal order. All EU law and national implementing measures must respect these general principles -which, since the early 1970s, have been interpreted by the court as requiring adherence to human rights that form part of the common constitutional tradition of EU member states or are recognized 21 See Ford, supra note 11.
22 See Amos, supra note 2.
in international treaties, such as the ECHR, that have been ratified by all member states.
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The CFR was intended to specify these human rights obligations with more precision. 24 It sets out a wide-ranging list of fundamental rights and principles, extending to cover certain social and citizen rights that human rights instruments such as the ECHR do not cover. Since 2009, it has had the same legal status as the EU treaties, meaning that all EU law and national implementing measures must comply with its requirements. 25 As confirmed by the CJEU in the case of NS, 26 its provisions apply to the United Kingdom notwithstanding the provisions of protocol 30 27 to the TEU, which affirm that nothing in the CFR extends the competency of the CJEU to set aside existing UK laws for incompatibility with fundamental rights principles: it appears as if the only legal impact of this protocol, often erroneously described as a UK opt-out from the CFR, may be to limit the application to UK law of certain social rights principles set out in the CFR. 28 Taken together, the general principles and the CFR serve as human rights guarantors within the EU legal framework: the provisions of EU law and national implementing measures must be read subject to their requirements and can be set aside by the CJEU and national courts if they are incompatible with the rights they protect. Both the general principles and the CFR have been applied so as to reinforce fundamental rights protection by the CJEU and national courts (including the UK Supreme Court) -with particular impact in areas such as immigration and asylum, the application of EU sanctions, data protection and discrimination law.
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However, this constitutional layer of rights protection provided by the general principles and CFR is unlikely to be preserved in a postBrexit United Kingdom. Once the United Kingdom leaves the European Union and the European Communities Act 1972 30 is repealed, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty will again take full effect: this means that national legislation will be immune from challenge on the basis of incompatibility with the general principles and/or the CFR, restricting the protection they currently afford to rights.
Furthermore, at the time of writing, the text of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill before Parliament provides that the CFR shall not remain part of UK law after Brexit. 31 This provision of the bill reflects the strongly negative views of many Conservative Party members of Parliament about the CFR and its wide-ranging set of human rights guarantees. It is not uncontroversial: the exclusion of the CFR from the carry-over provisions of the bill has been criticized by both the parliamentary opposition and the Equality and Human Rights Commission, 32 and the UK government has been forced to make the somewhat dubious argument that the provisions of the CFR add little or nothing to existing human rights protection. 33 However, absent from a significant shift in government policy, it is likely that the CFR will be uprooted from UK law on Brexit -taking with it the wide-ranging rights protection it currently offers within the scope of application of EU law.
This would leave the general principles of EU law still in play. While the general principles will not override parliamentary legislation post-Brexit, the UK courts will still be required to take them into account in interpreting those elements of EU law that will remain embedded in UK law. However, at the time of writing, the EU (Withdrawal) Bill provides that, from exit day onward, there will be no "right of action in domestic law…based on a failure to comply with any of the general principles of EU law." 34 This would prevent claims alleging a breach of the general principles being litigated in UK courts post-Brexit and limit the role of the general principles to being an interpretative aid. This particular government proposal risks destabilizing established EU law and, thus, generating legal uncertainty, so it may not survive the parliamentary debate on the withdrawal bill. However, as Alison Young has pointed out, the general principles lack specificity -meaning that, in the absence of the CFR, their usefulness as a source of rights protection post-Brexit may be limited.
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The EU (Withdrawal) Bill -Statutory Amendment by Executive Fiat?
Other concerns arise in relation to the legal mechanisms that the EU (Withdrawal) Bill provides for the UK government to amend or repeal the provisions of EU law that will continue to form part of UK law post-Brexit. The bill gives ministers wide-ranging powers to amend both transposed EU law and associated UK law via secondary legislation. 36 This means that ministers will have the power to amend or even repeal any aspect of EU law that protects human rights, along with any linked UK legislation, where necessary to give effect to the Brexit transition process. The use of such ministerial powers is open to scrutiny and veto by Parliament -but, in reality, Parliament's capacity to exercise a meaningful rights protective role in this context is limited by the exigencies of time, a lack of expert knowledge and government control over the business of the House of Commons.
Many commentators have identified the scope of these ministerial powers as a real threat to the enjoyment of human rights post-Brexit, given that these powers make it possible for existing legal guarantees to be diluted, amended or repealed by the exercise of potentially unaccountable executive 34 See EU (Withdrawal) Bill, supra note 1, Schedule 1, cl 3(1): see also (ibid) Schedule 1, cl 3(2) ("no court may disapply, quash, or decide that action is unlawful because it is incompatible with general principles of EU law"). power. 37 At the time of writing, amendments have been tabled to the withdrawal bill to limit the extent to which these powers can be used to alter existing EU/UK law that impacts upon equality and human rights, and to impose greater parliamentary controls on their use more generally. 38 It remains to be seen what political compromises will be reached in this regard. However, it would appear inevitable that EU law, in general, once converted into UK law post-Brexit, will be open to being extensively amended by fast-track executive action -which, therefore, poses, by extension, a risk to the legal protection EU law currently provides for various fundamental rights.
Assessing the Brexit Risk to Human Rights
It is, therefore, possible to identify specific risks that Brexit poses to the protection of human rights. However, if a meaningful overview of Brexit's potential impact on human rights is to be devised, it is not enough merely to point to the existence of such risks. Brexit may make certain existing forms of rights protection vulnerable, but that does not necessarily mean that the protections are likely to be swept away: risks can be real, without ever coming to fruition. To make a full risk assessment about the impact of Brexit on human rights, some analysis is needed of the probability of existing rights protection being diluted -along with some critical engagement with the question of whether the current (EU) status quo should be regarded as a baseline worth retaining when it comes to human rights.
Starting with the probability of the abovementioned risks coming to fruition, there are certain factors in play that suggest that Brexit is unlikely to result in a bonfire of rights-protective EU legislative instruments -at least, in the short to medium term. To start with, high levels of political disquiet have been expressed about the possibility of existing EU standards being diluted in fields such as equality law, labour rights and environmental protection. This has affected the political debate surrounding Brexit. For example, when she became prime minister in the wake of the referendum, Theresa May promised that there would be no dilution of existing workers' rights guaranteed through EU law. 39 Other government ministers have made similar remarks in respect of equality law and environmental protection. 40 The controversy that has surrounded the devolution dimension of Brexit -and, in particular, the issue of its impact on Northern Ireland -also makes it likely that both the current and future governments may feel the need to tread carefully when tinkering with EU baseline standards that help to secure human rights in politically sensitive areas such as equality law and environmental protection. There is also the possibility that the final withdrawal, transition and trade agreements to be negotiated with the European Union will require the United Kingdom to maintain regulatory alignment in various areas currently governed by EU law -with the trio of equality law, labour rights and environmental protection again being potential candidates for inclusion in this category. 41 In addition, there are areas where market forces will in all likelihood require the United Kingdom to continue to adhere to EU standards that are related to the enjoyment of human rights -such as data protection, where UK bulk holders of personal data that is sourced from a number of different EU states may need to maintain compliance with the EU data protection framework.
Having said that, there are also political factors in play which make it likely that there will be some Northern Ireland: "The UK commits to ensuring that no diminution of rights is caused by [Brexit] , including in the area of protection against forms of discrimination enshrined in EU law").
departure from existing EU standards that currently help secure human rights. At present, both the Conservative and Labour parties are committed to changing EU free movement rules as they apply to the United Kingdom -meaning that migrant rights are likely to be diluted in the wake of the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union. Furthermore, various political factions within the broad pro-Leave coalition have supported the idea of the United Kingdom embracing a lowregulation economic model. 42 If implemented now or in the future, such an adjustment could entail substantial departures from the current EU regulatory framework in areas such as labour rights and environmental protection. In any case, it is likely that UK governments in the future will use the regulatory manoeuvre room left to them by the post-Brexit EU/UK trade agreement(s) to make adjustments to British law that will entail a departure from the existing (EU) status quowhich again could impact on the protection that status quo currently affords to human rights.
Therefore, while the risk of a radical dismantling of existing EU legislation that has a rights-protective function can be overstated, it is likely that Brexit will result in some adjustment of the status quo. In other words, Brexit will open existing EU rights-protecting standards to review, revision and potential repeal -and this is likely to result in changes to these standards, which are likely to be implemented through the potentially problematic secondary legislation mechanisms set out in the EU (Withdrawal) Bill. Thus, commentators who point to the risk of Brexit impacting upon human rights protection, and express fear that such changes will not be always subject to sustained parliamentary scrutiny, have a point.
Nonetheless, change is not inherently bad, even when it relates to the enjoyment of human rights. The EU standards under discussion in this paper, which have conferred a degree of effective protection upon certain human rights in areas such as discrimination law, labour rights and migrant rights, are not the only way of securing such rights. Alternative modes of regulation might hypothetically confer equivalent or even superior levels of protection on such rights -or might protect rights in a way that resonates better with other values, such as democratic self-governance. 43 It is problematic to regard existing EU law that protects human rights -such as the CFR, or the equality directives -as sacred text: such instruments may be wellestablished features of the current European landscape of human rights protection, but that does not mean that replacing them with new legal frameworks need inevitably be a bad thing. This is why some commentators downplay the risks Brexit poses to human rights, choosing instead to argue that the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union represents a positive opportunity to open up debate about how rights are protected through law and to rethink existing (EU) methods of protection. 44 However, there are problems with this perspective. When viewed in isolation, Brexit might seem a plausible opportunity to rethink existing modes of rights protection in the United Kingdom, free from the dead hand of EU orthodoxy. However, the potential consequences of Brexit for human rights cannot be assessed in isolation, detached from the background political and constitutional context. If this context is considered, then additional causes for concern about Brexit's impact on human rights enter the picture.
To start with, if EU standards in areas such as migrant rights or non-discrimination are to be replaced over time by UK regulation, this replacement process will inevitably play out against the divisive backdrop of acrimonious political debates about immigration, equality rights, devolution and the United Kingdom's continuing relationship with Europe. This creates a risk that new legal standards will be framed with an eye on achieving short-term political gains or to appease special interests or particular segments of the electorate, rather than with a fuller perspective centred around the assumption that human rights need to be given presumptive priority in law making.
Furthermore, this replacement process is likely to be channelled through law-making mechanisms that are often lacking in transparency and democratic accountability. For example, the executive has historically played a dominant role in framing UK immigration rules -and ministers and civil servants have regularly been accused of exercising too much authority over the shaping and application of British law in this regard, which is characterized by a high degree of complexity and non-transparent decision making. 45 Now, the Brexit process will give even greater powers to the executive in this regard, in particular, due to the wide powers conferred on ministers by the provisions of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill. As a result, there are grounds for being concerned about how UK migration rules will be framed in the future -when ministers will, post-Brexit, be freed from the constraints of EU migration rules and the protective, rightsinfluenced jurisprudence of the CJEU. 46 Furthermore, if the CFR is excluded from UK law post-Brexit, and the status of the general principles of EU law is watered down as discussed above, then the range of human rights that are directly enforceable within UK law will be considerably limited. 47 The Human Rights Act 1998 48 (HRA) will continue to apply after the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union. However, the fundamental rights protected by the HRA are much more limited in scope than those protected by the CFR or the general principles of EU law.
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The HRA protects the core civil and political rights set out in the ECHR. However, the CFR's scope, in particular, is much greater, extending as it does to cover a wide range of dignitarian, social, equality and citizenship rights, in addition to the civil and political rights set out in the ECHR. 50 At present, the substance of many of these rights is not always clear, as the case law of the CJEU interpreting the CFR's provisions is still in embryonic form. 51 The extent to which respect for these rights is legally required as part of the general principles of EU law is also uncertain. Nevertheless, the requirements of the CFR, taken together with the general principles of EU law, considerably extend the range of individual rights claims that are directly enforceable before UK courts. 52 However, this will presumably change with Brexit. If the CFR is excluded from UK law post-Brexit, and the status of the general principles is diluted, then only the more limited range of rights protected by the HRA will be directly enforceable within UK law. 53 Indeed, a Brexit-related shadow even hangs over this limited floor of protection afforded by the HRA. It transplants rights protected by the ECHR into UK law -and, therefore, attracts political controversy, in particular, among many Brexit supporters, because the HRA is viewed as representing another instance of European supranational governance. 54 It may be the case that Brexit will divert attention and energy from the constant debates about the status and legitimacy of the HRA/ECHR, at least, in the short term. However, all forms of human rights law are likely to remain politically controversial -which means that any modification of existing EU rightsprotective standards is likely to be carried out in a climate of intense rights skepticism, which is likely to extend even to the relatively narrow range of civil and political rights protected by the HRA. 55 Lock, supra note 3.
standards. 56 The UK courts have been willing to recognize the existence of certain common law rights, such as freedom of speech and the entitlement to a fair trial: public authorities cannot act in a manner that limits the enjoyment of these rights unless they are expressly or by necessary implication authorized to do so by parliamentary legislation. 57 These rights are widely regarded as constituting home-grown human rights standards, whose lineage can be traced back to the Magna Carta. In recent years, the UK Supreme Court has shown a willingness to develop the case law relating to these common law rights -perhaps reflecting the current political hostility directed toward transnational European standards in this field. 58 This expanding case law shows that these common law rights have some teeth. They will also remain unaffected by Brexit and, thereby, will continue to provide a degree of rights protection even if European standards are amended, diluted or repealed. However, the scope of these rights -like that of the HRA -is limited to a narrow range of civil and political rights. 59 Furthermore, the rights' content is uncertain and controversy persists as to whether judges should play an active role in developing such rights standards in the absence of clear parliamentary authorization to do so. 60 As a consequence, it is unlikely that common law rights can plug the gaps that Brexit may potentially generate in UK law relating to rights protection.
Given this background context, there are substantial reasons to be concerned about how the Brexit process will impact on human rights. There is the possibility that well-established human rights standards will be reviewed, revised and possibly even repealed -and this replacement process is likely to unfold in a political climate unfavourable to human rights concerns. This provides a reason to be concerned about Brexit's impact on rights, especially given the limited scope of the HRA and common law rights. This concern may prove unfounded: future UK adjustments to existing EU standards in this field may not turn out to be very damaging. However, as things stand at present, some sense of foreboding about the future is justified.
Qualifying the Brexit Risk to Human Rights -A Tentative Conclusion
As Lock has argued, Brexit is rights neutral when considered on its own terms.
61 However, Brexit makes it possible for certain EU rights-protective standards to be diluted, amended or repealed over time. Furthermore, the outcome of this process may be less than optimal when viewed from a human rights perspective, especially when it comes to the treatment of migrants and certain other vulnerable groups. Therefore, this risk assessment leads to the conclusion that Brexit poses a potential danger to rights. This danger may never materialize. However, the rights-negative background context against which Brexit is unfolding, and the limits of the non-EU forms of legal rights protection that currently exist in UK law, cannot be ignored. As a result, care needs to be taken that the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union will not lead to a diluted respect for human rights. Human rights activists, and indeed anyone concerned with the protection of civil liberties and fundamental rights within UK law and policy, will need to be vigilant in the post-Brexit era.
61 Ibid.
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